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The Attorney General and the Charitable
Trust Act-Wills, Contest and Construction
Dale R. Martin*
T HERE IS GENERAL ACCORD that the Attorney General, as the
chief law enforcement officer of the state, shall represent
the public when a will makes provision for a public charity or
charitable trust.' This right is predicated on the ancient English
doctrine that the king, as parens patria, through his officer, the
Attorney General, watched over the administration of charities.
2
Since charities are matters of public interest the Attorney Gen-
eral is a necessary party to any matter dealing with them.
3
In Ohio the Attorney General shall appear in any court or
tribunal in which the state is interested.4 The common law inter-
pretation of the duties of the Attorney General regarding chari-
table trusts in the state of Ohio has been supplanted by statu-
tory law which is enumerated in Sections 109.23-109.33 of the
Ohio Revised Code, often referred to as the Charitable Trusts
Act.
Contest and Construction
In order to apply the Charitable Trusts Act to actions to
construe a will and to will contests, we must first differentiate
between the two. In an action to construe a will the court as-
sumes the validity of the will, whereas in a will contest the only
issue is the validity of the instrument.5 The object of an action
to construe a will is to interpret the testator's intentions as to
the dispositive provisions of the instrument; in a will contest the
court studies its mechanical construction, while its meaning and
intent are immaterial. 6
*BA., Mount Union College. Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 5 Am. Jur. 246 (1936).
2 Commonwealth v. Gardner, 327 S. W. 2d 947, 74 A. L. R. 2d 1959 (Ky.
App., 1959).
3 Anno: 74 A. L. R. 2d 1066 (1960).
4 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 109.02.
6 56 Ohio Jur. 2d 215 (1963).
6 Ibid.
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Ohio Revised Code, Section 109.23 defines charitable trusts
falling under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General and lists
exceptions to this definition. It reads as follows:
As used in sections 109.23 to 109.33 inclusive, of the Revised
Code, 'charitable trust' means any fiduciary relationship
with respect to property arising as a result of a manifesta-
tion of intention to create it, and subjecting the partnership,
corporation, person, or association of persons by whom the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property
for any charitable, religious, or educational purpose. There
are excluded from this definition and from the operation of
such sections, trusts until such time as the charitable, reli-
gious, or education purpose expressed in such trust becomes
vested in use or enjoyment. Such sections do not apply to
charitable, religious, and educational institutions holding
funds in trust or otherwise exclusively for their own pur-
poses nor to institutions created and operated as agencies
of the state government or any political subdivision thereof.
According to Section 109.25, the Attorney General must be
a party to any charitable trust proceedings, the object of which
is to:
(1) Terminate a charitable trust or distribute its assets to
other than charitable donees; (2) Depart from the objects
or purposes of a charitable trust as the same are set forth
in the instrument creating the trust, including any proceed-
ing for the application of the doctrine of cy pres; (3) Con-
strue the provisions of an instrument with respect to a
charitable trust.
If the Attorney General is not served with process in such
proceedings, then the judgment rendered therein is void and un-
enforceable. 7
a. Will Contests
Participation of the Attorney General is based on the fact
that the will contest seeks to establish whether the instrument
is the last will and testament of the testator.' If it is determined
not to be the last will and testament, then naturally the chari-
table bequest therein will fail. The Attorney General likewise
participates in an action to construe a will under Section 109.25
(3), which states that he is a necessary party in all actions seek-
ing to construe the provisions of an instrument with respect to
a charitable trust.
7 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 109.25.
8 Ibid., Sec. 2741.04.
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However, in Spang v. Cleveland Trust Co. the court deter-
mined that the Attorney General was not a necessary party.9
After providing for the payment of debts, the testator left the
rest and residue of the estate to The Cleveland Trust Company
in trust for specific uses and purposes. The trust provided for
monthly payments to relatives from its income, with the remain-
der of the income to be divided three ways: one-fourth to the
Rainbow Hospital, one-fourth to the Eliza Jennings Home of
Cleveland, and one-half to be used by the trustee at his discre-
tion as a revolving loan fund for the education of young people.
The court held that Revised Code, Section 109.25 does not
apply to a will contest case, because the object of a will contest
case is not the termination of a charitable trust. 10 The court,
however, went on to say:
This is a question of first impression and should be passed
upon by the reviewing courts.
This decision is questionable owing to its deviation from basic
common law rules." It also lacks authoritativeness because the
Attorney General was not given the opportunity to explain his
position.12
The reasoning in the Spang case is founded upon the court's
interpretation of Section 109.23 as to vesting in use or enjoyment.
The definition of charitable trusts as set out in this section is not
all-inclusive:
vast amounts of property which are, in fact, devoted to
charitable uses by means of gifts to charitable corporations
exclusively for a corporate purpose are excluded from the
requirement of the act, as are those trusts which are ulti-
mately to be used for charitable purposes, but which, by the
terms of the trust instrument, have no part of the trust
income or property presently being devoted to any chari-
table use.' 3
In Spang the court held that the charitable trust had not
vested in the beneficiaries at the time of the will contest. The
court did concede that the law favors early vesting of estates
9 73 Ohio L. Abs. 164, 134 N. E. 2d 586 (C. P. 1956).
10 Id. at 169.
11 9 Ohio Jur. 2d 12, 1963 Cumulative Supplement, Footnote 14.
12 Ibid.
13 Klapp and Wertz, Supervision of Charitable Trusts in Ohio-The Ohio
Charitable Trusts Act, 18 Ohio St. L. J. 181 (1957).
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CHARITABLE TRUST ACT
upon the death of the testator but added that this trust only
vested in the trustee and not in the use or enjoyment of the
beneficiaries and thereby was excluded from the provisions of
the Ohio Charitable Trusts Act.14 The Spang case involved only
specific qualifying charities as the court doubted that the re-
volving loan fund provided for in the will was charitable.15
Since critics feel that the case lacks certain elements of
prestige,16 it appears that the application of the rule should be
limited, if followed at all, to cases involving only specific qualify-
ing trusts. No will contest cases concerning this issue have
arisen since this decision. This might be attributed to fear on
the part of contestants as to the authority of this ruling.
b. Action to Construe a Will
The necessity of the Attorney General being joined as a
party comes up more frequently in actions to construe wills than
in will contests. This is easily explained when one realizes that
there is a great deal more litigation dealing with will construc-
tions.
Along with the majority of other jurisdictions Ohio has held
that the Attorney General is a necessary party where there is
a charitable bequest or devise in a will. This is evidenced by
Blair v. Bouton,17 wherein it was held that the Attorney General
is a necessary party when the construction would affect the size
of the charitable trust passing in the residue. The necessity of
the Attorney General's presence in such cases is also cited by the
Supreme Court in Donner v. Shanafelt.18
More recently there appears an exception to this general
rule in Baily v. McElroy. 9 In construing the will, the Probate
Judge ruled that the Attorney General was not a necessary party
where there had been no vesting in use or enjoyment of the
trust. Although the will had been probated some years prior to
this action, no trustee had been appointed to administer the
funds designated for charitable purposes. The Court of Appeals
later reversed the decision on other grounds, but in so doing
14 Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 109.23-10933.
15 Supra n. 9 at 166.
18 Supra n. 11.
17 15 Ohio Op. 2d 474, 176 N. E. 2d 280 (App. 1959).
18 159 Ohio St. 5, 110 N. E. 2d 772 (1953).
19 89 Ohio L. Abs. 289, 186 N. E. 2d 213 (Pro. Ct. 1961).
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indicated that the Charitable Trusts Act of Ohio was applicable
and therefore the Attorney General was a necessary party.20
Comparable State Statutes
Numerous states have enacted legislation on the adminis-
tration of Charitable Trusts. The authors of the Ohio Charitable
Trusts Act 21 appear to have looked to the statutory law of New
Hampshire and Rhode Island for guidance in framing the Act.
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated 22 resembles in large
degree Ohio Revised Code, Sections 109.23-109.33. The New
Hampshire statute also excludes certain public charities from
the definition of a charitable trust, i.e. those trusts to take effect
upon the death of the settlor until such trust becomes vested in
use or enjoyment.23 Whether the New Hampshire courts would
agree with the previously cited Ohio cases 24 is a moot question,
as there are no cases involving will contest or actions to construe
a will on point dated after the effective date of the statute. Gen-
erally, the New Hampshire courts have held that the attorney
general is an indispensable party in any judicial proceeding re-
lating to the supervision and enforcement of charitable trusts.25
Rhode Island also has a somewhat comparable statute but
does not list any exceptions, so it would appear that it is all-
inclusive. 26 The leading case in Rhode Island, a will construction
action, held that where a charitable trust is involved the attor-
ney general in his capacity as the representative of the interests
of the public is a necessary party.27 There are no subsequent
cases on point, so it would appear that enactment of the Rhode
Island Charitable Trust Act has not substantially modified the
common law.
20 Baily v. McElroy, 195 N. E. 2d 559 (Ohio App. 1963).
21 Supra n. 14.
22 Chap. 7:19-7:32.
23 N. H. Rev. Stat. Anno., Chap. 7:21
24 Spang v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra n. 9. Baily v. McElroy, supra n. 19.
25 Concord Nat. Bank v. Haverhill, 101 N. H. 416, 145 A. 2d 61 (1958).
26 Gen. Laws of R. I., Secs. 18-9-4, 18-9-5 (1950).
27 Leo v. Armington, 74 R. 1. 297, 60 A. 2d 475 (1948).
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Other Jurisdictions
Kentucky: Using Spang as authority, the Court of Appeals
in a recent decision held that the attorney general cannot inter-
vene in a will contest action .2  The court determined that the
Attorney General in the absence of any statute authorizing him
to intervene, failed to show that he was authorized by "any
established and recognized law of England to that effect prior to
1607," and therefore since the sole purpose of a will contest is
to determine whether the instrument is valid and not primarily
to determine a charitable trust, he is not a proper or necessary
party. The charitable gift in the will was of a general charitable
nature and provided for two trusts, the income from the first to
be transferred to the second, the Annie Gardner Foundation; the
funds of this second trust to be distributed for charitable pur-
poses.
England: As to specific legacies the court held that the At-
torney General is a necessary party to suits respecting the man-
agement of funds bequeathed or devised for charitable purposes.
However, they excluded legacies given to an established chari-
table institution to be comingled with that organization's general
funds.2 9
Pennsylvania: In an action to construe a will the Attorney
General is an indispensable party in any charitable trust pro-
ceeding whether the object of the proceeding be to invalidate,
terminate, enforce, or administer the trust. The court went on
to say that his position is a result of the authority vested by the
power of parens patria.30
New Jersey: On an action to construe a will the Attorney
General should be a party to the proceeding. This suit, to deter-
mine the plan or scheme of payment and an appointment of a
trustee to administer the distribution, concerned a specific qual-
ifying charity.8 '
Iowa: The reason for the rule that the Attorney General is
the proper person to institute and/or defend suits involving pub-
lic charities is that he is the only person capable of vindicating
28 Commonwealth v. Gardner, supra n. 2.
29 Wellbeloved v. Jones, 1 Sir. & Stu. 40, 57 Eng. Reprint 16 (1822).
80 In Re Voegtly's Estate, 396 Pa. 90, 151 A. 2d 593 (1959).
81 Christian v. Catholic Church of St. John the Baptist of Paterson, 51 N. J.
Eq. 374, 110 A. 579 (1927).
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the public's right, since no private individual can say that he is
the designated object of the charity's benevolence. 32
Also, see Lackland v. Walker,33 and Attorney General v.
Clark.3 4
Conclusion
The Spang decision places Ohio in the minority as to the
necessity of the Attorney General as a party in a will contest
action wherein a specific qualifying charity is designated. Yet
the reasoning in this case, i.e., the absence of vesting in use or
enjoyment of the beneficiaries, appears sound in conjunction with
the exact statutory language and no doubt will be extended to
include general charitable bequests and devises.
The Baily v. McElroy decision 35 on actions to construe a
will used the same reasoning, although it was later reversed be-
cause of a faulty ruling on the merits. Both cases, in this writer's
opinion, point out an inadequacy in the Charitable Trusts Act of
Ohio. As the designated representative of the public, the Attor-
ney General should be a necessary party to any proceedings in-
volving public charities. To insure that he is made a party, the
language of the statute relating to vesting in use and enjoyment
requires clarification, at least, and possibly elimination.
32 In Re Owens Estate, 244 Ia. 533, 57 N. W. 2d 193 (1953).
8 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414 (1933).
34 167 Mass. 201, 45 N. E. 183 (1896).
35 Supra n. 19.
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